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Europe at the Epicenter of National Politics:  
The Attitudes of Greek Political Elites Towards  
the European Union and the Economic Crisis 
Yannis Tsirbas & Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos ∗ 
Abstract: »Europa am Epizentrum nationaler Politik. Die Einstellungen der 
griechischen politischen Eliten zu EU und Wirtschaftskrise«. This article pre-
sents new research on the Europeanness of Greek political elites under the eco-
nomic crisis. It registers the views of a sample of 74 Greek Members of Parlia-
ment (MPs) on European integration and the handling of the economic crisis by 
the European Union (EU). The ENEC survey, which was conducted in 2014, 
shows that Greek MPs continue to be attached to Europe, but evaluate nega-
tively the role of EU’s institutions during the economic crisis. They mostly view 
European integration positively, but are skeptical about the representativeness 
of EU organs. There is a discernible set of “core attitudes” which constitute the 
Europeanness of Greek MPs, but there is also a set of issues on which MPs are 
clearly divided. The dominant dimension of conflict within Greek political elites 
is the issue of economic austerity packages, i.e., the Memoranda of Under-
standing (MoUs), as since 2010 EU’s management of the crisis has become the 
epicenter of Greece’s domestic politics. The two party, SYRIZA-ANEL coalition 
government that was formed after the January 2015 elections was not a sur-
prise given the close proximity of these two parties on their stance towards the 
MoUs and the EU. 
Keywords: Political elites, European integration, identity, representation, Euro-
peanness. 
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1.  Introduction1 
National political elites in Europe tend to understand European integration in 
the context of their more immediate national political, economic and cultural 
environment and take a stance on European Union (EU) affairs based on the 
following two items: first, on whether and how the EU benefits their country 
and, second, on the performance of their political party and evolution of their 
own political career (Best 2012). Greece is no exception to this pattern, as, until 
the economic crisis struck, Greek Members of Parliament (MPs) typically held 
an instrumentalist view of EU-Greece relations (Nezi, Sotiropoulos and Toka 
2009; Nezi, Sotiropoulos and Toka 2010; Freire, Tsatsanis and Tsirbas 2014).  
In other words, Greek parliamentarians understood European integration 
less in normative terms and more in terms of, first, a supra-national project 
which offered a safe place to anchor a country which had become a consolidat-
ed democracy only after the fall of the Colonels’ regime (1974) and was peri-
odically influenced by tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean; and, second, a 
EU laid-out pathway to economic development and improved living standards, 
i.e., an opportunity to converge with the rest of West European countries. 
Indeed, after Greece joined the then European Communities in 1981, politi-
cal stability and improving economic performance, despite occasional lapses 
into periods of high inflation and persisting unemployment, characterized the 
path which the country followed (Kazakos and Ioakimidis 1996, Tsoukalis 
1997; Dimitrakopoulos and Passas 2004; Pagoulatos 2014). Stability and eco-
nomic development were clearly aided by the inflow of EU funds into Greece, 
based on EU's agricultural, regional and cohesion policies, to the point that 
Greeks and their political elites may have perceived the EU as a “milking cow” 
(Scheuer 1999, 37). In this context, Greek political elites overall mostly calcu-
lated that the potential benefits from Greece’s engagement with the EU out-
weighed potential losses. Unavoidably they colored their views on Europe 
using the colors of the left, right or center ideology of their political party, with 
the conservatives being steadily pro-EU, the socialists abandoning their anti-
EU stance after the benefits of EU integration for Greece became obvious 
(Verney 1996) and the much less consequential communists altogether refusing 
to accept EU.  
                                                             
1  The authors of this article acknowledge a research grant from the Hellenic Observatory of 
the London School of Economics and Political Science; the support of Professor Kevin 
Featherstone and the staff of the Hellenic Observatory, the research assistance of Panayota 
Toka, Anastasia Papaconstantinou and Gerta Lezi; and the encouragement and guidance of 
Dr. Jose Real-Dato, coordinator of the European National Elites and the Crisis (ENEC) pro-
ject, Dr. Lars Vogel, the editor of this special issue, and the anonymous reviewers of the arti-
cle. 
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Taking into account this instrumental relation to the EU, the majority of 
Greek parliamentarians had settled down to the idea that the EU had become a 
constant, albeit somewhat distant, aspect of their political universe. In fact, the 
EU did not loom large in Greek domestic politics, until the economic crisis 
struck. There was no national referendum on the EU, prior to Greece’s 1981 
accession to the then European Communities or on the occasion of any major 
EU treaty. Moreover, relatively little parliamentary debate over EU treaties, let 
alone EU policies, took place in the Greek parliament until 2009-2010. At that 
time point the negative effects of the global financial crisis combined with the 
culmination of long-term trends of running state budget deficits and negative 
current account imbalances and produced an implosion of the Greek state’s 
finances. Compared to other Eurozone Member-States, Greece was hit the 
earliest and probably the most by the economic crisis (Storm and Naastepad 
2014). Intense political debates on the role of the EU in the Greek crisis took 
place in the Greek parliament and media. 
When in the first semester of 2010, the Greek government resorted to the 
rescue mechanism put together by the European Commission (EC), the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a new 
era of EU-Greece relations dawned upon Greece. It naturally affected the place 
and significance of Europe in Greek domestic politics and provided a stimulus 
which influenced and polarized the attitudes of Greek parliamentarians, as this 
article will argue. 
After 2009 Greece became and still is dependent on external financial aid, 
coming predominantly from the EU. National economic and other public poli-
cies were co-produced by Greek officials and the representatives of the three 
aforementioned international actors (the ‘Troika’), in a process during which 
Greek government elites succumbed to the guidelines of the ‘Troika’, who 
represented the country’s lenders. And EU organizations and lender countries 
in the Eurozone closely monitored the evolution of the “Greek Programme”, as 
the Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) signed between Greece and its credi-
tors in 2010 and again in 2012 came to be known.  
In the course of and because of these developments, the EU largely affected 
party politics in Greece (Verney 2014). Metaphorically speaking, after the 
economic crisis erupted in Greece, the EU traveled from the perimeter to the 
epicenter of the Greek political scene and established itself there. The way the 
EU and successive Greek governments handled the crisis provoked a series of 
reactions, reflected not only in the reinforcement of erstwhile small political 
parties on the Left (SYRIZA) and the rise of new political parties on the Right 
(the nationalist Independent Greeks-ANEL and the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn – 
GD), but also in the “core attitudes” of Greek parliamentarians constituting 
their Europeanness.  
In what follows, we are going to present and interpret such attitudes of par-
liamentarians. We are going to focus on their national and European identity; 
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  89 
perceptions of threats to the EU; trust in EU institutions; allocation of public 
policy-competencies to national- and EU-levels of decision-making; concep-
tions of the current and future status of European integration; and finally per-
ceptions of performance of EU institutions during the crisis. We will argue that 
(in contrast to the past) such “core attitudes” towards the EU are pivotal for the 
formation of new cleavages in Greek party politics. Such cleavages were once 
only marginally affected by the status of EU-Greek relations, but are now heavily 
shaped, if not completely over-determined, by how Greek politicians interpret 
and evaluate the changing relations between Greece and the EU under the crisis. 
The data used for our analysis come from the European National Elites and 
the Crisis (ENEC) project, which was conducted in Greece, as well as in nine 
other European countries in 2014. A total of 74 Greek MPs were interviewed in 
Athens between February and October 2014, using a structured questionnaire. 
In order for the final sample to be representative of the national assembly, 
quota sampling was applied, in terms of party, gender and whether the MP was 
a newcomer in parliament or not. The only exception in terms of sample repre-
sentativeness is the Greek Communist Party (KKE) which did not issue a per-
mission to its MPs to participate as interviewees in this study (or any other 
similar study, for that matter). Our research refers to the parliament elected in 
June 2012 and dissolved in December 2014. 
1.1  The Political Context  
In order to put the attitudes of MPs in the context of Greece’s party system, a 
very brief presentation of Greek political parties follows. New Democracy-ND 
is a centre-right political party which has been one of the two most dominant 
political forces since 1974, alternating in power with the social democratic 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement-PASOK. ND and PASOK dominated the 
Greek party system in 1974-2012. The twin, aptly labeled ‘earthquake’, elec-
tions of May and June 2012 (Voulgaris and Nikolakopoulos 2014) saw the rise 
of SYRIZA to the status of the main opposition party in the Greek parliament. 
Also this was the first time in recent decades that seven parties entered the 
parliament, including the afore-mentioned neo-Nazi GD, as previously far 
fewer parties were represented in parliament. After the earthquake, elections of 
2012, ND and PASOK formed a coalition government. At that point, because 
of its central role in the signing and implementation of bail-out agreements, 
PASOK had already suffered severe electoral losses. Democratic Left-DIMAR, 
which was founded in 2010 after a split from SYRIZA, also took part in the 
coalition government, only to exit the government one year later, in 2013. The 
parliament of 2012-2014 also included the aforementioned KKE, GD and 
ANEL parties. 
As already noted, since the onset of the crisis fierce political debates have 
taken place on whether Greece or the EU were to be blamed for the crisis and 
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whether the measures provided by MoUs were appropriate or even necessary. 
A major erosion of social trust and a great delegitimation of the political sys-
tem as a whole preceded the crisis and paved the way for the dealignment of 
the Greek political and party system (Verney 2014, 20).  
Since our elite survey was finished, two parliamentary elections were held 
in Greece. These took place in January 2015 and again in September 2015, 
with a similar election outcome (SYRIZA came first, ND trailed far behind it). 
Moreover, a national referendum was held between these elections, in July 
2015, with the question of whether or not Greece should adopt a third bail-out 
agreement proposed at the time by the EU. The referendum was vested by 
some political forces, like ND and PASOK, as a decision upon Greece’s mem-
bership in the Eurozone and the EU altogether. These two parties, along with the 
newly formed centre/centre-left party “the River”, called for a “yes” vote (the 
latter party did not exist before mid-2014 and won parliamentary representation 
for the first time only in 2015). On the other side, the governing coalition of 
SYRIZA and ANEL parties called for a “no” vote, describing the referendum as 
an opportunity to curb austerity policies and a desire to reshape EU politics. 
Finally, the “no” vote won with 61 per cent. However, one week later the Greek 
government agreed with the EU on a third, austerity-driven, bail-out program. 
As shown in Table 1, neither in the January 2015 parliamentary election nor 
in the corresponding election of September 2015 did a party hold the absolute 
majority of 151 (out of the total of 300) seats needed to form a single-party 
majority government. In both instances, a coalition government of SYRIZA 
and ANEL was formed. 
Table 1: Greece: June 2012, January and September 2015 Parliamentary 
Election Results and Allocation of Parliamentary Seats 
 September 
2015 (%) 
September 
2015 
No of seats 
January 
2015 (%) 
January 
2015 
No of seats 
June 2012 
(%) 
June 2012 
No of seats 
SYRIZA 35.5 145 36.3 149 26.9 71 
ND 28.1 75 27.8 76 29.7 129 
GD       7           18 6.3 17 6.9 18 
PASOK* 6.3 17 4.7 13 12.3 33 
KKE 5.6 15 5.5 15 4.5 12 
The River 4.1 11 6.1 17 - - 
ANEL 3.7 10 4.8 13 7.5 20 
DIMAR** - - 0.5 - 6.3 17 
Other 9.7 9 8.5 - 5.9 - 
Total 100 300 100 300 100 300 
* Allied with DIMAR in the elections of September 2015. 
** Allied with Ecologists-Greens in the elections of January 2015. 
Source: Greek Ministry of Interior (<http://ekloges.ypes.gr/current/v/public/index.html#{"cls": 
"main","params":{}}>. 
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It is worth noting, as shown in Table 1, that in the January 2015 elections the 
pro-EU left party DIMAR nearly vanished from the Greek political system, and 
it has been replaced, at least in terms of electoral influence, by a new player, 
the “River” party. 
2.  The Shifting Views of Greek Parties and Elites 
Regarding Greece in the EU 
2.1  European Identity 
One of the “core attitudes” of Europeanness is the European identity of Greek 
parliamentarians. European identity can be measured as the degree of attach-
ment to Europe, contrasted to the degree of attachment to two other levels of 
political community, namely Greece and region (by which we mean electoral 
district). Attachment to Europe is weaker (77 per cent) than attachment to 
region, i.e., electoral district, (86.5 per cent) and Greece (100 per cent). How-
ever, among Greek MPs in 2014 attachment to Europe is higher than in 20072, 
when it was 50 per cent (Table 2). 
Table 2: Attachment to Different Levels of Community. Percentage 
Distribution of Responses (Very/Somewhat Attached)  
 2007* 2014 
Attachment to region 86.5 98.6 
Attachment to Greece 93.6              100 
Attachment to Europe             80.2                 77 
* InTune project. 
 
Compared to 2007, attachment to Europe slightly increased among Greek MPs 
in 2014, however remained at relatively high levels. This result should be seen 
in the light of a consensus among all Greek elites of the Left and the Right 
which was formed the hard way, namely, after all elites realized that the coun-
try could not stand on its own feet to manage the crisis. Greek elites probably 
realized that external aid was necessary and that the only available life-
sustaining device was provided by the EU. After all, even SYRIZA, which in 
the past had voiced very strong Eurosceptic views, has remained faithful to its 
                                                             
2  In 2007 the ‘InTune’ (standing for ‘Integrated and United’) research project was conducted 
on European and national identity, representation, and the scope of governance. It involved 
surveys of elites and mass publics in 16 EU Member-States and two candidate Member-
States, on the basis of a common standardized questionnaire. Data from the ‘InTune’ survey 
of 2007 for Greece is used in this paper in order to identify changes across time. 
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own version of Europeanism, namely an anti-neoliberal European project 
(Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014, 131, 138; Nikolakakis 2016). 
This is also borne out by the results of Table 3. Despite the fact that MPs of 
SYRIZA are not as enthusiastic as the MPs of other parties (ND, PASOK, 
DIMAR) towards Europe, still their attachment to Europe is quite high and 
certainly much higher than that of the two far right parties, ANEL and Golden 
Dawn (GD). PASOK’s MPs are the most attached to Europe (100 per cent), 
followed by those of ND (87.5 per cent). Compared to MPs of ND and 
PASOK, SYRIZA’s MPs are much less attached to Europe (73.7 per cent) 
(Table 3).  
Table 3: Attachment to Europe, Percentage Distribution of Responses by Party *  
 Total ND SYRIZA PASOK ANEL GD DIMAR Indep. 
Very/somewhat 
attached 77 87.5 73.7 100 33.3 0 100 66.7 
[χ2 (6, N = 74) = 25.866, p = 0.000, Cramer’s V= 0.591] 
* Since ANEL, Golden Dawn, DIMAR and Independent MPs have small Ns, hereafter results for 
these parties are considered indicative. Results of the 2007 InTune survey on this variable are 
not available. 
2.2  Perceived Threats to Europe and the EU 
It is quite interesting that Greek parliamentarians believe that the two biggest 
threats to the EU are economic in nature, namely economic differences among 
Member States (86.5 per cent) and the competition from emerging economies, 
e.g., Asian economies (60.8 per cent). The prominence of economic threats in 
the minds of Greek MPs should be interpreted in the light of the grave econom-
ic crisis which Greece was undergoing during the time our interviews were 
conducted and also in the context of the popular perception of the EU in Greece 
as a major source of improvement of Greece’s material wealth (Pagoulatos 
2014). In brief, the EU was perceived as a source of economic prosperity for 
the country much more than a project of political or cultural integration. After 
all, even before the onset of the economic crisis, the framework through which 
Greek policy makers used to understand the position of Greece in the EU was a 
framework of national exceptionalism (Pagoulatos 2004). Immigration from 
non-EU countries is the third most important perceived threat to the EU, with 
54.1 per cent of Greek parliamentarians considering it to be “a big” or “quite a 
big” threat (Figure 1). It has to be noted, however, that the interviews were 
concluded in 2014, when refugee/migration issues had not yet acquired centre-
stage in EU politics, as they did in 2015 and 2016. 
The propensity of EU Member States to put their national interests first is 
the fourth most important perceived threat to the EU (51.4 per cent). This is not 
a surprise given that in Greece the process of European integration has often 
been understood as an inter-governmental process (Kazakos and Ioakimidis 
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1994). Finally, despite the long-time mistrust between Greece and Turkey, 
enlargement of the EU to include Turkey is considered a threat by 41.9 per cent 
of Greek parliamentarians. This is a comparatively low score and reflects a 
shift in Greece’s foreign policy, dating back to 1999, when a rapprochement 
between the two countries was couched in the context of the EU. 
Figure 1: Threats to the EU (A Big Threat/Quite a Big Threat) as Perceived by 
Greek MPs 
 
Results of the 2007 InTune survey on this variable are not available. 
2.3  Trust and Efficacy of European Institutions 
The trust of MPs in European institutions has been on the decline since 2007. 
As already noted, the ‘Troika’ entrusted to monitor Greece’s successive eco-
nomic adjustment programmes since 2010, included higher-level officials of 
the European Commission. Unsurprisingly, as shown in Table 4, trust in Euro-
pean Commission (EC) has seen the largest decline, with the mean score being 
4.6 in 2014 from 6.0 in 2007. The European Parliament (EP) is the most trusted 
institution amongst Greek parliamentarians, with the mean score being 6.7 in 
2014 down from 7.1 in 2007. 
Party affiliation is a statistically significant explanatory variable of trust in 
European institutions, with ND’s and PASOK’s MPs showing the most trust 
and SYRIZA’s MPs showing the least trust. (Table 5).  
Also, parliamentarians self-positioning on the right and on the centre of the 
political spectrum show more trust in European institutions than parliamentari-
ans self-positioning on the left (no table). This finding confirms the suggested 
relationship between ideological self-placement and trust in the various Euro-
pean institutions (Nezi, Sotiropoulos and Toka 2009). 
86,5
60,8
54,1
51,4
41,9
Economic differences among member states
Competition from emerging countries
 Immigration from non EU countries
The propensity of member states to put
their national interests first
Enlargement of the EU to include Turkey
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Table 4: Greek MPs: Level of Trust in EU Institutions (Mean Scores 2007 and 
2014) 
 Political 
Elites 
2007* 
Political Elites 2014 
  Total ND SYRIZA PASOK ANEL GD DIMAR Indep. 
Trust in the 
European 
Parliament 
7.1 6.7 7.7 5.3 7.1 7.7 3.8 8.3 6 
Trust in the 
European 
Commission 
6.0 4.6 6.6 2 5.1 3.7 2.4 5.3 2.7 
Note for tables hereafter: Trust is measured on a 0-10 scale where 0 indicates no trust. Euro-
pean parliament [F(6,67)=7.722, p=0.000)], European Commission [F(6, 67)=22.199, p=0.000)]. 
* InTune project. 
 
Regarding the handling of the crisis, the MPs’ evaluation of EU institutions is 
overall negative. The European Commission and the European Central Bank 
(ECB) are evaluated with 4.1 on an 11-point scale (0.0-10.0), where zero is the 
most negative point. The European Council is evaluated slightly higher, with 
4.5 (Table 5). As expected, MPs of governing parties which had signed 
Greece’s bail-out agreements of 2010 and 2012 and implemented the corre-
sponding policies have a more positive evaluation of the EU institutions which 
handled the crisis. Indeed ND’s parliamentarians evaluate the European Com-
mission with 5.8, the European Council with 6.3 and the ECB with 6.4. The 
corresponding figures for PASOK, which was the other major party in the pro-
austerity coalition government of 2011-2014, are 4.9 for the Commission, 5.5 
for the Council and 5.9 for the ECB. Naturally, the opposite holds for the MPs 
of the then opposition parties, especially SYRIZA, the MPs of which evaluated 
the ECB with 0.8, the European Commission with 1.4 and the European Coun-
cil with 1.7 (Table 4).  
Table 5: Evaluation of EU Institutions’ Role During the Crisis in 2014 (Mean 
Scores by Party) 
 Total ND SYRIZA PASOK ANEL GD DIMAR Indep. 
European 
Commission 4.1 5.8 1.4 4.9 3.7 2.6 4 3.7 
European 
Council 4.5 6.3 1.7 5.5 4 3 4 3.7 
European 
Central Bank 4.1 6.4 0.8 5.9 2.7 0.8 4 3.7 
European Commission [F(6, 67)=13.389, p=0.000)], the European Council [F(6, 67)=12.919, 
p=0.000)] and the European Central Bank [F(6, 67)=33.293, p=0.000)]. Results of the 2007 
InTune survey on this variable are not available. 
 
The attitudes of MPs on how EU institutions managed the crisis are also differ-
entiated by their self-placement on the left-right axis. More concretely, MPs on 
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  95 
the right give the most positive evaluations, while those on the left the most 
negative, in statistically significant relationships (no table). This is an expected 
outcome, given the harsh criticism of austerity policies by the Greek Left al-
ready since the start of the economic crisis (Tsakatika and Lisi 2013, 15). 
2.4  Allocation of Public Policy Competencies and Scope of 
Governance 
According to Greek MPs, immigration (70.3 per cent), environmental policy 
(54.1 per cent), banking and financial regulation (48.6 per cent) and unem-
ployment (47.3 per cent) are policy areas that should be dealt with at the Euro-
pean level. On the other hand, health care provision and fighting crime are 
policy areas thought to be better dealt with at the national level (48.7 per cent 
and 51.4 per cent respectively, Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Preferred Level for the Formulation of Policies  
 
2.5  Conceptions of Europe 
The absolute majority of MPs in our sample support the process of furthering 
the unification of the EU: 54 per cent of Greek parliamentarians are positioned 
on the three most positive points of the eleven-point scale, being in favour of 
having a more unified EU. Evaluation is measured on a 0-10 scale where 0 
denotes an absolute view that “unification has gone too far” and 10 an absolute 
view that “unification should be strengthened”. The mean score of our sample 
on this scale is 7 (Table 6). 
With regard to further promoting EU’s unification, the parliamentarians of 
PASOK score the highest (mean score of 9.1). ND’s MPs follow with a mean 
score of 8.2. SYRIZA’s MPs have a mean score of 5.6, which is slightly above 
70,3
54,1
48,6
47,3
25,7
18,9
20,3
32,5
21,6
33,8
25,7
29,7
9,5
13,6
29,7
19
48,7
51,4
Immigration
Environmental policy
Banking and financial regulation
Unemployment
Health care
Fighting crime
European level Other Combinations including Europe National/regional level
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the middle point of the scale and underlines the fact that the need for further 
unification of the EU is widely acknowledged among Greek political elites, 
although Greek parties, which these elites belong to, do not agree on the appro-
priate policy mix. 
Table 6: “Has European Unification Gone too far or Should it be 
Strengthened?” (Mean Scores by Party)  
 Total ND SYRIZA PASOK ANEL GD DIMAR Indep. 
Mean 
scores 7.0 8.2 5.6 9.1 6 1.8 8.3 6.7 
F(6, 66)=8.568, p=0.000). 
 
The opinions about further promoting European unification are differentiated 
by left-right self-placement in a statistically significant relationship. MPs on 
the Centre favour the furthering of EU’s unification the most, with a mean 
score of 8.1, followed by MPs on the right (mean score 7.4, no table). 
With regard to the issue of supranational or intergovernmental scope of EU 
governance, agreement with the statement “the European Commission ought to 
become the true government of the European Union” is at 52.7 per cent 
amongst Greek MPs, while disagreement is at 47.3 per cent (Table 7, below). 
In other words, Greek political elites are divided on this issue. This is a division 
which can be interpreted in the context of very heated debates in the Greek 
parliament and mass media on the role of the Troika, which included represent-
atives of the Commission, in the formulation and even the day-to-day manage-
ment of public policies, while the Greek crisis was unfolding.  
2.6  The Meaning of Europeanness for Greek Political Elites 
The meaning of Europeanness among Greek political elites can be operational-
ized with an eye to how Greeks have conceptualized the EU over time. As 
already argued in the introduction to this article, Greeks have often understood 
the EU in utilitarian terms, something which is particularly true for the Greek 
Parliament (Sotiropoulos 2015). This is the primary but not exclusive dimen-
sion of Europeanness in the eyes of Greek elites. 
Indeed, there have been instances at which Greece has sought to play a larg-
er role than its diplomatic clout and the size of its economy would allow, such 
as, for instance, during the Greek Presidency of the EU in 2003, when the 
Greek government convened a special summit on the crisis in Iraq and in an-
other summit also orchestrated EU’s commitment to the European perspective 
of West Balkan countries (the Thessaloniki Agenda of June 2003). Overall, 
however, Greek elites have primarily thought about what the EU can do for 
Greece than what Greece can do for the EU (a tendency not limited to the case 
of Greece). It is in this context that we should interpret the finding that more 
than three quarters (77 per cent) of Greek MPs believe that Greece has benefit-
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ed from Greece’s membership in the EU, while only 17.6 per cent believe that 
it has not benefited (no table). SYRIZA’s MPs are divided on this issue: one 
half believes that Greece has benefited from EU membership, whereas the 
other half rejects this view. By contrast, MPs of PASOK and ND agree the 
most with the view that EU membership has been beneficiary for Greece, with 
100 and 96.9 per cent respectively (no table). 
Additionally, Greek MPs overall agree that in ten years there should be 
“more help for the regions” (98.6 per cent) and a common social security sys-
tem (81.1 per cent), reminding us that the previously-mentioned notion of the 
EU as a milking cow is not abandoned. Moreover, Greek political elites agree 
that “the powers of the European Parliament should be strengthened” (83.8 per 
cent). It can be asserted that the latter finding is related to the generalized dis-
content caused by EU’s perceived poor responsiveness to the varying and 
changing situation of its Member States: 95.9 per cent of the respondents 
somewhat or strongly agree that “the interests of some member-states carry too 
much weight at the EU level” and 83.6 per cent somewhat or strongly agree 
that “those who make decisions at the EU level do not take enough account of 
the interests of Greece”. 
Table 7: Summary of “Core Attitudes” of Europeanness for Greek Political 
Elites (Percentage of Agreement 
 % 
(In ten years) there should be more help for the regions 98.6 
The interests of some member-states carry too much weight at the EU level 95.9 
Economic differences between member-states are a threat to the EU 86.5 
The powers of the European Parliament should be strengthened 83.8 
Those who make decisions at the EU level do not take enough account of the interests of 
Greece 
83.6 
(In ten years) there should be common social security 81.1 
Greece has on balance benefited from being a member of the European Union 77.0 
Immigration should be dealt at the European level 70.3 
The European Commission ought to become the true government of the European Union 52.7 
 
In view of the above, we could summarize Europeanness for the Greek political 
elites as follows: most MPs view the EU in a positive light and believe that 
European unification should be further strengthened. European unification 
should take a direction which, on the one hand, would entail economic support 
for weaker Member States and curb economic differences among them and, on 
the other hand, include more responsiveness, possibly through the strengthen-
ing of the role of the EP and the transfer of powers from the national to the 
supranational level as far as migration policy is concerned (Table 7). 
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3.  The Main Dimensions of Greek Political Elite’s 
Attitudes Towards the EU 
Now that we have identified what unites Greek parliamentarians, we also have 
to see, more systematically, what divides them when it comes to EU issues. In 
other words, from the analysis presented so far stems a need to further identify 
what is the main dimension which shapes the different attitudes of the Greek 
political elites towards the EU. Up to this point we have established that views 
about the institutions and the prospects of the EU are mainly differentiated 
according to the party to which MPs belong and to ideological self-positioning. 
Furthermore, we are interested in detecting latent variables which could explain 
MPs’ opinions and stances in a more parsimonious way, by reducing the origi-
nal number of variables. In order to identify possible latent variables or dimen-
sions that could explain attitudinal differences among MPs, a principal compo-
nents analysis (PCA) was conducted. PCA is generally used to simplify 
datasets by reducing data while, at the same time, not losing vital information. 
The new variables, which are called principal components, are linear functions 
of the original ones.  
Then, the components derived from the PCA are used as independent varia-
bles in a discriminant analysis, where the dependent variable is the party affil-
iation of the MPs. Discriminant analysis is used to determine the optimal com-
bination of the independent variables (i.e. “functions”), which explains the 
classification of cases in different categories of the dependent variable (Fisher 
1936; Friedman 1989). In our case, PCA helps to attribute meaning to the 
structure of competition and conflict among Greek MPs. The PCA was intro-
duced by Pearson (1901) and was further developed by Hotelling (1933) (see 
also Joliffe 2002; 1972; 1973). By using it, we seek to determine the degree to 
which the discovered issue dimensions can serve to discriminate or distinguish 
among parties. 
Functions are interpreted in terms of standardized coefficients for each in-
dependent variable. The larger the standardized coefficient, the more the re-
spective latent dimension contributes to the discrimination among parties. In 
order to portray the relevant positions and distances among parties across each 
function, group centroids are also employed. Typically, only statistically signif-
icant (p<0.05) components and functions are presented, and this is what we do 
in the rest of this article. 
3.1  Results 
We have incorporated all the relevant variables (items) in our initial PCA, 
while at the same time we have explored new possibilities with items which 
were not that obviously related to our research questions. Then, we have 
dropped all the variables which did not load to the main components or were 
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loaded highly to both of them. Finally, eight items regarding attitudes of Greek 
MPs towards the EU were used in the PCA, which returned two components 
that together explain almost 60 per cent of the total variance (Table 8). The first 
component is dominated by items capturing a Pro-European/Eurocritical dimen-
sion, while the second component comprises items that refer to a Federal-
ism/Intergovernmentalism division. Of course, only questions related to the EU 
and Europe were asked in the context of the ENEC study, so the components 
extracted here represent only the realm of European-related values and attitudes.  
Table 8: Greek MPs-Principal Components Analysis 
Agree-Disagree Pro-European / Eurocritical 
Federalism-
Intergovernmentalism 
The EU endangers the integrity of the Greek cultural 
system  0.785 0.137 
Achievements of welfare system in Greece are 
endangered by the EU legislation  0.780 -0.353 
The EU endangers the quality of democracy in 
Greece  0.747 -0.313 
EU decisions endanger economic growth in Greece  0.737 -0.289 
Most important decisions concerning the EU should 
be taken by a majority of all European citizens via a 
European popular referendum  
0.695 -0.051 
The European Commission ought to become the true 
government of the European Union  0.129 0.875 
Some say that we should have a single European 
Union Army  -0.417 0.611 
The Member States ought to remain the central 
actors of the European Union  0.182 -0.523 
Eigenvalues 3.485 1.288 
% variance  37.9 21.8 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
 
Our discriminant analysis produced two statistically significant functions, but 
one of them comprises almost 96.7 per cent of the total variance (Table 9). In 
this dominant function (or dimension of conflict), the component with the 
highest standardized coefficient is Pro-Europeanism / Eurocriticism. When 
plotting the relevant position of parties across the Pro-Europeanism / Eurocriti-
cism dimension, a pro-bailout agreement/anti-bailout agreement set-up is re-
vealed, with three parties, namely GD, SYRIZA and ANEL on the one end and 
another three parties, namely DIMAR, PASOK and ND on the other. This 
means that the main dimension of conflict regarding European issues is, in fact, 
the pro/anti memorandum divide, which seems to give meaning to the Pro-
Europeanism/Eurocriticism dimension. In any case, due to the low number of 
cases in our sample, the results of the PCA and discriminant analysis depicted 
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in Table 9 are considered only indicative. Further research may be necessary in 
order to confirm the results shown in this table. 
Table 9: Greek MPs Discriminant Analysis (N=69)* 
Function 1: Canonical correlation: 0.85 / 96.7% of variance 
 
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Func-
tion Coefficients 
Structural Coefficients 
Pro European/ 
Eurocritical 
1.09 
Federalism-
Intergovernmentalism
-0.88 
Pro European/ 
Eurocritical 
0.65 
Federalism-
Intergovernmentalism 
-0.34 
    
Mean location of MPs on the function (group centroids) 
 
*Only the most powerful statistically significant (p<0.05) function is presented. The other 
statistically significant function is responsible for only 3.3 per cent of total variance and is 
dominated by the Federalism-Intergovernmentalism factor, with a standardized canonical 
discriminant function coefficient of 0.75 and a structural coefficient of 0.94. The relevant 
position of parties on the second function remotely resembles a Left-Right dimension. 
3.2  The Coalition Government of SYRIZA-ANEL and the EU 
The formation of a SYRIZA-ANEL coalition government twice within a year 
(just after the elections of January and September 2015) was in accordance 
with the above presented discriminant analysis, in which these two parties were 
on the same side of the dominant dimension of Pro-Europeanism/Eurocriticism 
already before the elections of 2015. Also, it has to be noted that even though 
the aforementioned two elections have already been held since our interviews 
were conducted, we maintain that Greece political landscape is not that differ-
ent, since our research still refers to the “new” party system and correlations of 
power that emerged after the elections of 2012, when the Greek party system was 
completely revamped. Therefore, we can construct the combined ‘worldview’ of 
today’s SYRIZA and ANEL (SYRIZA-ANEL) parliamentary majority toward 
the EU. This is so even though the total number of MPs of these two parties 
changed after the January and September 2015 elections, when SYRIZA obtained 
145 seats and ANEL 10 seats, compared to 71 and 20 respectively, in the parlia-
ment of 2012-2014 on which our research was conducted.  
In Table 10 there is a summary of SYRIZA-ANEL’s MPs views and atti-
tudes on several important issues in comparison to the rest of Greek parliamen-
tarians. A main conclusion is that SYRIZA-ANEL’s MPs, taken as a group, are 
systematically less pro-European and more skeptical towards EU institutions 
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than the rest of MPs. Compared to their colleagues from other political parties, 
SYRIZA-ANEL’s MPs feel less attached to Europe and trust less the European 
Parliament and the European Commission, despite the fact that, regarding the 
EP, the mean score of trust is above average, 5.6.  
Table 10: Comparison of SYRIZA-ANEL’s MPs with the Rest of Greek 
Parliamentarians in Core Views and Attitudes (Percent) 
 Total SYRIZA-ANEL Others* 
Attachment to Europe (% Very/somewhat attached) 77 68.2 80.8 
“Greece’s interests are not taken into account by those 
making decisions at the EU level” (% Strong-
ly/somewhat agree) 
83.6 100 76.5 
Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU 
(% Very/Fairly satisfied) 36.5 4.5 50 
The EU as a threat to economic growth in Greece (% 
Strongly/somewhat agree) 51.4 95.5 32.7 
(In ten years) Common tax system (% approve/rather 
approve) 73 54.5 80.8 
(In ten years) Common social security (% ap-
prove/rather approve) 81.1 68.2 86.5 
(In ten years) Common foreign policy (% approve/rather 
approve) 74.3 54.5 82.7 
Trust in the European Parliament (mean score 0-10) 6.7 5.6 7.2 
Trust in the European Commission (mean score 0-10) 4.6 2.2 5.7 
“Has European unification gone too far or should it be 
strengthened?” (mean score 0-10) 7.0 5.7 7.6 
*MPs of all other parties. This categorization is done for presentation purposes, in order to 
flesh out the views of MPs of the SYRIZA-ANEL government coalition. 
 
All of SYRIZA-ANEL’s parliamentarians believe that Greece’s interests are 
not adequately represented at the decision-making centers of the EU. At the 
same time, only 4.5 per cent of SYRIZA-ANEL’s MPs are very or fairly satis-
fied by the way democracy works in the EU, a figure that rises to 50 per cent 
amongst the rest of parliamentarians. Moreover, 95.5 per cent of SYRIZA-
ANEL MPs consider the EU as a threat to economic growth in Greece, as op-
posed to only 32.7 per cent of other parties’ MPs and 51.4 per cent in total.  
Regarding the prospects of further European unification, SYRIZA-ANEL’s 
MPs are somewhat skeptical. Their mean score on the eleven-point scale (0-10) 
about the need for strengthening the unification process is 5.7, i.e., significantly 
less than the 7.6 score amongst the rest of parliamentarians. Furthermore, com-
pared with the rest of MPs, the MPs of SYRIZA-ANEL are less in favour of any 
enhancement, in the next decade, of common taxation, social security system and 
foreign policy. However, even amongst SYRIZA-ANEL’s MPs positive evalua-
tions of common policies are held by the absolute majority of MPs. 
Finally, a finding that can be considered as a harbinger of the SYRIZA-
ANEL coalition government is that the MPs of these two parties evaluate very 
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negatively the handling of the crisis by EU’s institutions. On the eleven-point 
scale (0-10), were 0.0 means an absolutely negative evaluation, they evaluate 
the European Commission with a mean score of 1.7, the European Council with 
a mean score of 2.0 and the ECB with a very low 1.1. 
In sum, SYRIZA and ANEL’s MPs views during the parliamentary term of 
June 2012-December 2014 confirm our claim that the dominant division 
amongst Greek political elites has to do with stances towards the EU. The two 
parties’ MPs share a critical view of EU institutions in general and their role in 
the handling of the crisis in particular, while they are not as enthusiastic about 
the prospects of European integration as are their colleagues from most other 
parties. The above findings underline the fact that even before SYRIZA’s elec-
toral victory there was indeed common ground for the seemingly incongruous, 
in ‘classic’ left-right terms, coalition government between SYRIZA and ANEL 
that was formed after the January 2015 parliamentary elections. 
4.  Conclusion 
The views of Greek MPs on the issue of European identity seem to somewhat 
follow pre-crisis patterns. Attachment to Europe remains strong. However, trust 
in EU institutions is on a steep decline and there is an overall negative evalua-
tion of the way in which EU institutions managed the crisis. As expected, the 
above views and attitudes are differentiated mainly according to party affilia-
tion and self-placement of MPs on the left-right axis. However, there is a wider 
acceptance of the need for furthering the European unification, although it 
would be logical to assert that different political affiliations and ideological 
predispositions of MPs would mean the attribution of different meanings to 
European unification. 
Greek parliamentarians generally agree on the road which the EU should 
follow in the future: they desire economic help for the regional countries, the 
transfer of policy-making responsibilities regarding immigration, the environ-
ment and some structural finance issues to a supranational level as well as the 
strengthening of the European Parliament.  
When it comes to threats to the EU, economic issues seem to be perceived 
as the most threatening, such as the economic differences between EU Member 
States and the competition from emerging economies outside of Europe. 
Hence, what unites Greek parliamentarians on European issues or their sense of 
Europeanness can be summarized as a positive European experience, as Greece 
has benefited from EU membership. The MPs’ positive stance is complement-
ed by their desire to see further economic support for the weak in Europe and 
more responsiveness of EU authorities at the decision-making level. 
However, it has been clear from the above-presented findings that there are 
more than a few things that separate Greek political elites on European issues. 
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Notably, party affiliation and ideological self-placement are differentiating 
factors of Greek MPs’ views and attitudes. Looking deeper, however, through 
the conduct of principal component and discriminant analyses, we have found 
out that there is an issue dimension, which mainly structures the differences of 
opinion among Greek MPs: this is pro-Europeanism/Eurocriticism. The plot-
ting of political parties across the issue dimension of pro-Europeanism / Euro-
criticism has revealed an arrangement of pro-bailout agreement parties on the 
one end and anti-bailout agreement parties on the other end of this dimension. 
This specific finding sheds light on the ostensibly bizarre coalition government 
between the radical left-wing SYRIZA and the right-wing nationalist ANEL, a 
coalition formation which occurred twice, both after the January and Septem-
ber 2015 elections. Especially concerning the views and attitudes of SYRIZA-
ANEL MPs, this research has demonstrated that they were consistently more 
critical towards the EU and skeptical about its prospects, compared to the total 
of MPs.  
In sum, our analysis has shown that the fiscal and financial crisis has not to-
tally altered the “milking cow” perception of Greek MPs about the EU. Also, 
membership in the EU as a positive experience and the furthering of unification 
still enjoy a broad consensus. However, new features have been added to the 
Greek political elites’ sense of Europeanness, mainly because of the negative 
evaluation of EU’s handling of the financial crisis. These features include the 
need for fairer political representation in the EU and the resolution of thorny 
economy-related issues as the most crucial factors for EU’s survival.  
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